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Abstract 
 
 
The financialisation of advanced economies has developed in part through the 
widespread engagement of workers with the financial sector, specifically through the 
increasing adoption of household debt. Taking on debt establishes “investor identities” 
for borrowers, which disciplines borrowers to demand employment and marginalises 
worker bargaining power. Although increased levels of household debt have been linked 
with a declining wage share of national income, there has been little examination of the 
effects of the specific channel of mortgage credit, the largest source of household debt, 
on the wage share. A series of regression models were implemented to test the 
relationship between the total mortgage stock and the wage share of GDP in four different 
countries, across three different Varieties of Residential Capitalism. While the panel data 
results demonstrate a negative relationship between mortgage credit and the wage share 
across the typologies, the relationship is concentrated in the liberal markets of the UK 
and the USA, and does not hold independently in Sweden and Denmark. There are four 
important differences that may explain the divergent results: (1) mortgages in liberal 
markets are provided at a higher cost than in non-liberal markets; (2) the use of mortgage 
bonds in non-liberal markets facilitates renegotiations in periods of borrower 
uncertainty; (3) the level of collective bargaining in Social Democratic states may 
strengthen worker wage negotiations; and (4) workers in liberal markets are reliant on 
mortgage finance to access the home as a financial asset in systems of asset-based 
welfare. The combination of which may explain how the increased disciplinary effects of 
mortgage finance have resulted in the reproduction of the conditions for capital 
accumulation in liberal capitalist states. 
 
Keywords: Financialisation, wage share, mortgage debt, asset-based welfare  
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1. Introduction 
 
The functional distribution of income between wages and capital has been recast significantly 
since the 1970s, as the wage share of national income has declined across the advanced OECD 
countries in favour of capital, which, in turn, contributes to the wider trend of increased social 
inequality (Stockhammer, 2013, viii). Neo-classical economists have considered globalisat ion 
and skill-biased technological change as the main drivers of this observed decline (e.g. Rodrik, 
1998; IMF, 2007); however, post-Keynesian scholars have identified the phenomenon of 
financialisation as the principal cause for the reduction in the wage share observed in the 
advanced OECD economies (Stockhammer, 2013, 7, 43). The post-Keynesian understand ing 
of financialisation is based on the increase of financial sector activity in advanced economies, 
which has occurred in part due to the diffusion of financial services into the “everyday life” of 
workers, predominantly through the widespread increase of household debt (Froud et al, 2002; 
Stockhammer, 2013; Köhler et al, 2015). Engagement with financial services has been 
identified as a mode of behaviour regulation and taking on household debt establishes “investo r 
identities” for borrowers, which marginalises their wage bargaining power and disciplines them 
to demand employment to meet their debt obligations and stave off the negative threat of 
default (Froud et al, 2002; Langley, 2007; Lazzarato, 2012; Köhler et al, 2015). An econometric 
analysis has demonstrated that increased levels of household debt, as a proxy for the diffus ion 
of the “investor identity” in an economy, are an important causal factor in the reduction in the 
wage share in advanced economies (Köhler et al, 2015, 18). However, not all channels of 
household debt carry the same financial burden or the same negative consequences of default, 
and such a generalised analysis of the effects of household debt masks the specific mechanisms 
that can lead to a reduction of the wage share. Mortgage debt is the largest single source of 
household debt, which carries severely negative legal and social consequences for default, and 
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private housing is considered a key node of financialisation that has led to an increase in 
household engagement with financial services through the sustained demand for mortgage 
credit to access owner-occupied housing (Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 2014; Aalbers, 
2008; Schwartz, 2008). While housing finance has been identified as a key instrument of 
financialisation, there has been little examination of how engaging with the specific channel of 
mortgage credit may contribute to increased inequality through the observed reduction in the 
wage share in advanced economies, which is where this paper seeks to make an empirica l 
contribution. 
 Neo-Weberian scholars Schwartz and Seabrooke (2008) have developed a systematic 
examination of different typologies of residential property markets and their correspond ing 
systems of housing finance, entitled the Varieties of Residential Capitalism (VORC). From a 
Neo-Weberian perspective, the decision to engage with mortgage finance is based on bottom-
up consent, as it provides access to socially beneficial outcomes in terms of the social norm of 
owner-occupied housing and the material gains from the home as a financial asset (Schwartz, 
2008; Seabrooke, 2002, 29). However, despite the Neo-Weberian emphasis on the distribution 
of material gains as a bottom-up mechanism of consent, there has not been a sufficient 
examination of the effects of an increased exposure to the channel of mortgage credit, which 
is necessary for workers to engage with in order to access the socially beneficial outcomes 
from private housing, on material gains in terms of wages relative to capital. Therefore, this 
paper will attempt to bridge an important lacuna in both the financialisation literature and the 
VORC capitalism literature through the implementation of an econometric model to test the 
hypothesis as to whether there is a statistically significant negative relationship between 
changes in the engagement with mortgage finance and the wage share of national income in 
advanced financialised economies. 
 A comparative quantitative analysis was performed to evaluate the effects of changes in 
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the total mortgage stock, as proxy for the degree of engagement with mortgage finance, on the 
wage share of national income across three different VORC between 1979 and 2012; the 
Liberal markets of the USA and Britain; the Corporatist market of Denmark; and the Statist-
Developmentalist market of Sweden (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008, 256). Although there is 
prima facie evidence that each case has experienced an absolute reduction in the wage share of 
GDP during this time period, as well as increasingly financialised housing markets, the politica l 
and economic institutional configurations between each case suggest that there may not be a 
single generalisable relationship across these different VORC. The key findings of this analysis 
lend support to the differences in institutional configurations inherent to a comparative politica l 
economy approach, as the results demonstrate that an increase in mortgage credit has a negative 
effect on the wage share of national income in the Liberal markets of Britain and the USA 
between 1979 and 2012, however, there is no significant relationship between an increase in 
mortgage credit and the wage share in the Corporatist market of Denmark or the Statist -
Developmentalist market of Sweden during this same period. To account for these results, the 
most feasible explanation can be linked to the variance in institutional configurations between 
the typologies that shape the mortgage finance system, as well as the wider political economy 
of collective bargaining and welfare state structures, which may have positive counter-
balancing effects on the disciplinary mechanisms of mortgage finance. The important 
differences in the institutional configurations may be summarised to four key points: (1) 
mortgages in liberal markets are provided at a higher cost to the borrower than in non-libera l 
markets; (2) the widespread use of the mortgage bonds in non-liberal markets allows for more 
flexible renegotiations in periods of borrower economic uncertainty; (3) the increased level of 
co-operative collective bargaining in Social Democratic states may strengthen worker wage 
negotiations; and (4) workers in liberal markets are increasingly subjected to the disciplina ry 
mechanisms of mortgage finance, as access to the home as a financial asset in systems of asset-
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based welfare is contingent on the ability of the worker to meet their debt obligations . 
Therefore, these institutional differences suggest that the mortgage credit channel of 
financialisation may be considered a disciplinary mechanism that facilitates the conditions for 
capital accumulation in the liberal markets of Britain and the USA, which is not present in 
Denmark or Sweden. The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the second section 
of this paper will examine the different theoretical perspectives on the relationship between 
financialisation and the wage share, while the third section will outline the empirical design of 
the eight quantitative regression models used in this analysis. The fourth section will provide 
an account of the data used in the analysis, which will be followed by a fifth section consisting 
of a descriptive analysis the data. The sixth section will describe the key results of the 
regression models and the seventh section will discuss the results of the analysis in a 
comparative political economy context, which will be followed by a brief summaris ing 
conclusion. 
 
2. Financialisation and the wage share 
 
A key area of analysis for classical economists was the functional distribution of nationa l 
income between workers and capital, where wages were thought to be compensated relative to 
the value of what labour produced, and capital accumulation was identified as being positive ly 
related to the rate of profit (Smith, 1976, 82-87; Ricardo, 1821; Stockhammer and Ederer, 
2008, 484). Alternatively, neoclassical economists assume that all factors of production are 
valued at their marginal product, and the factor input share of national income would, therefore, 
be linked to the relative demand and supply elasticities of the corresponding factor of 
production (Marshall, 1920). While it is not necessary for waged income shares to be constant 
across different industrial sectors, neoclassical theory argues that the overall wage share of 
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national income should remain relatively consistent over time (Solow, 1958, 628). However, 
the post-Keynesian critique of neoclassical theory has demonstrated that the wage share of 
national income has declined in favour of capital across the advanced OECD economies since 
the 1970s (Stockhammer, 2013).  
 Traditionally, the key causes for the reduction of the wage share of national income have 
been identified as failures to adapt to technological change and globalisation, yet it is 
financialisation, defined in this case as the deregulation of the financial sector that has led to 
an increase in international financial openness, that has emerged as the dominant cause of the 
shifts in the functional distribution of income in favour of capital in advanced economies 
(Stockhammer, 2013, 43). Such an analysis suggests that the dominance of the financial sector 
has occurred due to the deregulation of financial markets, which could be mitigated through 
increased government interventionist policies (Stockhammer, 2010). However, the emphasis 
on a state-centric solution does not sufficiently account for the political power relations that 
would seek to hinder any attempt to redress the dominance of the financial sector (e.g. Talani, 
2012). Additionally, the prominence of the financial sector cannot be reduced to the operation 
of ‘high finance’ above other sectors in the economy arising from the deregulation of the sector.  
Rather, the rise to prominence of the financial sector is linked to the increasing integration of 
financial services into the everyday life of wage-earners in society, through widespread 
investment in commodity vehicles, such as securitised financial products, as well as the 
diffusion of mortgage credit to fund private home purchases (Froud et al, 2002; Schwartz, 
2008). While the post-Keynesian position successfully identify financialisation as the key 
driver in the reduction in the wage share, it has failed appropriately account for the mechanisms 
of bottom-up consent that has lead citizens to actively demand access to specific channels of 
financial services, which has contributed significantly to the ascendency of the financial sector.  
 The Neo-Weberian position addresses these two points by arguing that any 
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disequilibrium in the economy, such as the functional distribution of income, is derived from 
the political power struggle between human interests for material gains (Wiley, 1983, 39; 
Mann, 1988, 59). Potential homeowners choose to access financial services as a means to 
access the socially beneficial outcomes of housing in terms of the social norm of private 
housing and the material gains from the home as a financial asset (Schwartz, 2008; Seabrooke, 
2002, 29). The Neo-Weberian scholars have established distinct typologies of residentia l 
housing markets, which allows for the identification of the varying weight of importance of 
owner-occupied housing in different housing markets, as well as the relative sophistication and 
diffusion of the systems of mortgage finance (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008). While a 
significant contribution is made through the development of the typologies of housing systems, 
there has been no examination of the different typologies of the VORC and the corresponding 
effects of the wage share, which is an important area for the Neo-Weberian position as it relates 
to the distribution of material gains within an economy in terms of wages relative to capital.  
Additionally, the emphasis on material gains ignores loss aversion, which argues that human 
behaviour is motivated by mitigating losses rather than achieving gains, and has been identified 
as an evolutionary trait in humans (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, S258; Lakshminaryanan et 
al, 2008).  
 The incorporation of loss aversion allows for Marxism to make a significant entry point  
here, as the distribution of income can be related to the power struggle over the distribution of 
the profits of production between social classes, where the working class is put in a position to 
minimise losses against the owners of capital (Wright and Perrone, 1977, 53; Clarke, 1990, 
465). A structured power relation has been identified within advanced financialised economies , 
where a portion of the subordinate worker’s income is expropriated by the dominant financ ia l 
firms in the form of corporate profits (Lapavistas, 2009, 133). Such an analysis makes an 
important contribution through the identification of the power relation between financial firms 
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and workers that redistributes waged income towards financial capital; yet the emphasis on 
such a top-down mechanism marginalises the importance of active bottom-up consent, which, 
in capitalism, is based on exposure to the commodification function that establishes a fear of 
physical insecurity, and subsequently creates active working class demand for income, via 
employment, to mitigate such physical insecurity (Tronti, 1966). Therefore, loss aversion is the 
very mechanism that establishes bottom-up consent for workers to engage as the subordinate 
party in the financial power relation with dominant financial firms in advanced financialised 
capitalism. Wage suppression policies have been implemented by firms and states seeking to 
be domestically and internationally competitive on price, which has contributed to the 
reduction of the wage share across the OECD economies (Bengtsson and Ryner, 2014). 
Therefore, workers may choose to take on debt in order to mitigate consumption losses 
resulting from the downward pressure placed on wages (Barba and Pivetti, 2009; 
Stockhammer, 2015). However, despite such a link between increases in household debt and 
the functional distribution of income, the direction of causality goes from income distribution 
to debt, which does not explain how the decision to engage with debt effects the wage share  
(Köhler et al, 2015, 9).  
 Financialisation has been identified as a mode of regulation, and from a Foucauldian 
perspective, engaging with financial services provides the individual with an internal logic that 
influences the constitution of their interests and identities (Froud et al, 2002; Langley, 2007). 
The decision to take on debt places the borrower in a subordinate position in their relationship 
with a lender, as the lender is able to set the terms of access to the loan, and engaging with 
financial services establishes an “investor identity” for the borrower, where the negative 
consequences of defaulting on a debt disciplines workers to service their debt obligations that 
are a source of revenue for the financial sector (Langley, 2007; Köhler et al, 2015, 9; Lazzarato, 
2012). Here there is a tentative link to loss aversion, as the threat of default from the decision 
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to take on household debt establishes a coherent logic to maintain employment that will 
mitigate any potential losses resulting from a debt default. Therefore, the decision to take on 
household debt acts as a disciplinary mechanism that increasingly exposes workers to financ ia l 
vulnerability, which reinforces their dependency on employment and marginalises their 
bargaining power with their employers (Köhler et al, 2015, 9; Lazzarato, 2012). Based on the 
disciplinary mechanisms inherent to the “investor identity”, an econometric analysis has 
demonstrated that an increase in household debt is significantly related to a reduction in the 
wage share in the advanced OECD economies (Köhler et al, 2015, 18). Despite the results of 
this analysis, not all sources of household debt carry similar financial burdens or have the same 
degree of negative consequences on defaults, and such a general examination of household 
debt fails to account for the differentiated underlying causal mechanisms that are endogenous 
to specific channels of financialisation.  
 For most workers, the private owner-occupied home is the most significant financ ia l 
asset in their portfolio, but the ability of workers to access private housing is often contingent 
on their ability to access to mortgage finance, which often carries the largest household debt 
burden (Montgomerie and Büdenbender, 2014). The decision to take on mortgage debt when 
purchasing a property leads the potential borrower to internalise the demands of the lender, 
which establishes a motivation for individuals to have an income from employment, a sufficient 
level of savings for a down-payment, and a credit history in good standing (Langley, 2013). 
Additionally, accessing mortgage finance exposes the borrower to a series of disciplina ry 
mechanisms over the entire duration of the loan, as the penalties for deviating from a mortgage 
lending agreement by defaulting on a mortgage are often severe, and have much more negative 
consequences than defaulting on other forms of debt. If a mortgage borrower defaults on their 
loan, they may be forcibly removed from the property, and their credit history will be marked 
down, which reduces their ability to access forms of credit in the future. A mortgage default 
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may also hinder access to rented accommodation and certain employment roles, especially in 
the financial sector and mortgage debt is considered a recourse loan, where borrowers are liable 
for any negative equity remaining after their property has been repossessed (Aron and 
Muellbauer, 2010, 6). The loss of employment and reduced earnings are the most common 
causes of mortgage default (Ford et al, 2010); therefore, the potential negative consequences 
of default act as the disciplinary mechanisms of mortgage finance, which reproduces the 
demand for employment by the loss averse borrower to maintain an income that allows them 
to meet their debt obligations to the lender, further marginalising their wage bargaining 
position. However, despite the importance of the high debt burden and significant disciplina ry 
mechanisms inherent to mortgage finance, there has been no empirical investigation of the 
impact of mortgage debt on the wage share, which is where this analysis seeks to make a 
contribution. From the results of previous studies on the effects of the aggregated productive 
outcomes of household debt on the wage share (e.g. Köhler et al, 2015), one would expect to 
see a negative relationship between an increase in total mortgage debt in an economy and the 
wage share of national income. Therefore, a series of time-series cross-sectional regression 
analyses will be implemented to test the hypothesis as to whether there is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between changes in the engagement with mortgage finance 
and the changes in the wage share of GDP between 1979 and 2012 across the VORC in 
Denmark, Sweden, Britain and the Unites States of America.  
 
3. Empirical Design 
 
The VORC typologies will be used to test the hypothesis across different housing and mortgage 
markets, and are primarily based on the institutional frameworks that have established 
variations of the owner-occupation rate and the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP between states 
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(Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008, 256).  In the VORC typologies the owner-occupation rate is 
used to identify the level of housing commodification in each state, while the ratio of mortgage 
debt to GDP indicates the degree of financial repression in each economy (Schwartz and 
Seabrooke, 2008, 248). The demarcation of these specific typologies may not be perfectly 
applicable or generalisable, yet the distinction between different housing markets established 
by the VORC provides a viable and valuable means of establishing a comparative account of 
different housing markets and their corresponding systems of mortgage finance. According to 
the VORC typologies, Britain and the USA have been identified as fitting the liberal market 
form of residential capitalism, which is characterised by high levels of owner-occupation and 
high ratio of mortgage debt relative to GDP (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008, 256). The liberal 
markets are highly commodified, with private housing used as a financial asset, and many 
citizens are priced-out of the private housing market, which has created inter-generationa l 
equity problems (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008, 256). The corporatist Danish housing market 
is characterised by housing provision, both public and private, as a social right, with relative ly 
lower levels of owner occupancy, but a high mortgage debt to GDP ratio (Schwartz and 
Seabrooke, 2008, 256). The Swedish statist-developmentalist market similarly considers 
housing as a social right, which is also provided by both the private and public sector, but with 
lower rates of owner-occupation than the corporatist and liberal markets, and the repression of 
financial markets in Sweden has limited the mortgage debt to GDP ratio (Schwartz and 
Seabrooke, 2008, 256)i. 1979 was selected as the starting year for this comparative analysis of 
VORC as it marks the point where inflation targeting became the economic objective at the 
expense of full employment, which denotes the start of the decline of the era of Fordism and 
the beginning of the period of post-Fordist financialisation (Korpi, 2002).  
 This econometric analysis will consist of eight models in total; two time series cross-
section panel data models that examine the pooled data from the three VORC, a random effects 
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model and a fixed effects model, which will then be followed by a time series model of each 
individual state; Denmark, Sweden, Britain and the USA. The seventh model will consist of a 
panel data model examining the liberal VORC countries only, the UK and the USA, while the 
eighth model will form a pooled analysis of the non-liberal VORC, Sweden and Denmark, as 
observed by Ansell (2014, 400). Sweden and Denmark have been identified as belonging to 
the same category in various different typologies of comparative political economy, such as 
the co-ordinated market variety of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The pooling of 
Sweden and Denmark into the same typology allows for a comparison of the degree of housing 
commodification in each state, using the welfare state regimes (WSR) identified by Esping-
Andersen (1990). In the liberal states of the UK and USA there is a greater degree of housing 
commodification than in social democratic states of Denmark and Sweden, due to the 
prevalence of private housing markets over other forms of housing provision, which may be 
provided or more heavily regulated by the state (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
 OLS regression models of pooled time-series cross-sectional data can suffer from 
autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity, or both simultaneously. Furthermore, there may also be the 
presence of contemporaneous correlation of errors (Plümper et al, 2005, 329). Therefore, to 
correct for these potential errors, a panel Prais-Winsten transformation model will be used to 
establish robust panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Plümper et al, 2005, 349; Beck and 
Katz, 1995). The four PCSE models (1, 2, 7 and 8) will be run using the AR1 autocorrelat ion 
structure to address problems of serial correlation, and will assume panel-level heteroskedastic 
errors to mitigate for heteroskedasticity. The first panel data model will be a random effects 
(RE) model, which assumes that the variation across each VORC is random and is uncorrelated 
to the independent variables within the model, while the second panel data model includes 
fixed effects (FE) to account for any potential country-level bias. The four subsequent models 
will provide a segregated examination of each country used in the panel data analysis, albeit 
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with a much smaller number of observations, which may indicate whether there are any 
differences according to each VORC. The last two models will compare the liberal and social 
democratic welfare state systems to account for any differences between the levels of 
commodification of housing. The dependent and independent variables remain the same in 
each model.  
 
4. Data 
 
The dependent variable in each model is the wage share of GDP, which is calculated using an 
employee compensation measure as the numerator, to fully account for wages and non-wage 
payments in-kind, such as pension and healthcare contributions (Kruger, 1999). GDP at factor 
cost is used as the denominator, as it can be divided entirely between employee compensation 
and gross capital shares (Kruger, 1999; Rognlie, 2015, 5). Capital depreciation could be 
included to account for the replacement costs for capital, which would establish a net value 
added measure of domestic product (NDP); however, the NDP variable is incompatible with 
the employee compensation measure used in this analysis, therefore, the GDP measure is used 
(Bengtsson and Ryner, 2014, 6). Alternatively, the social wage, which accounts for non-wage 
benefits in-kind from welfare services such as welfare transfer payments and public healthcare, 
was also considered as a potential dependent variable in this analysis to account for the role of 
the welfare state in each case. However, much of the social wage data is collected at the micro-
level from household surveys, which is not compatible with an aggregate macro-leve l 
examination of the distribution of national income (Sefton, 2002); therefore, an employee 
compensation measure of GDP will be used to examine the wage share in this analysis. 
There are three independent variables used in this analysis to refine the accuracy of the 
model specification according to the “rule of three” (ROT) (Achen, 2002, 446)ii. The number 
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of variables has also been limited to account for the reduced number of observations in the 
individual case models, which allows each model to use the same number of independent 
variables and provides a valid means of comparison between models. The key independent 
variable that is used as a proxy to examine the engagement with mortgage credit in each VORC 
is the total outstanding mortgage balance (OMB), which accounts for new mortgage loans as 
well as the reduction of mortgage balances paid off by borrowers. Alternatively, a specific 
residential mortgage lending variable could have been used, however, many of the sources (e.g. 
Hypostat) do not have data coverage for the whole time period of this analysis. Additionally, 
OMB data is used by professional analyses of residential mortgage lending (e.g. the UK 
Building Societies Association (Rex, 2013)); therefore, the OMB data will be used by this 
analysis. The OMB variable has been transformed using a natural logarithmic scale to examine 
the growth of the volume of the mortgage stock in each economy. The coefficient generated 
using the natural-log scale is interpretable as a close approximation of the percentage change, 
which is relevant to this analysis (Gelman and Hill, 2007, 60-61). The use of such a natural log 
technique is widely used in econometric empirical work, including economic projects 
undertaken by government bodies (e.g. Mawson, 2002, 5).  
The second independent variable in each model is the unemployment rate, which will 
be used as a proxy for wage bargaining power (Dünhaupt, 2013, 11). The unemployment rate 
is thought to be a key determinant of wages in labour economics, and is included to account 
for the effects of changes in wages from the overall labour supply, which is considered to have 
a negative relationship with wage growth (Clark and Hyson, 2000, 1; Ehrenberg and Smith, 
2009, 513).  Although the different wage bargaining and welfare state structures suggest that 
there would be different results for the unemployment variable between the liberal and non-
liberal cases, an increase in wage bargaining power is positively linked to an increase in the 
wage share (Bengtsson and Ryner, 2014). The third independent variable examines the 
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ideological centre of gravity of each parliament to account for the different politica l 
institutional environments in each VORC, based on the mean right-left (RILE) position of each 
party that ran in each election, weighted by the vote share each party received (Gross and 
Sigelman, 1984, 467). The ideological centre of gravity for parliament has been included as a 
means of accounting for the influence of opposition policies as a counter-acting force that limits 
the implementation of policies that merely suit the political group in control of the institutions 
of the state. There have been criticisms of CMP database (e.g. Gemenis, 2013); however, the 
data generated by the CMP has been widely cited, and the RILE scale established by the CMP 
is also comparable to several independent right- left scales, which suggests that the CMP may 
be considered a widely accepted source (Laver, 2014, 217)iii. Descriptive statistics for all 
variables can be found in Table 1.  
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
5. Descriptive Analysis 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 examines the changes in the employee compensation share of GDP between 1979 and 
2012 in the UK, Sweden, the USA, and Denmark. In Britain, there was an initial increase in 
the wage share of GDP after 1979 that subsequently declined from 1980 until 1996, but from 
1997 to 2001 there was a significant recovery in the wage share. Over the whole period, the 
average wage share of GDP in Britain has been decreasing, as demonstrated by the negative 
linear trend-line. The Swedish case also demonstrates a negative linear trend line, but at a 
steeper gradient than the British case. The period between 1991 and 1995 shows a sharp decline 
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in the wage share of GDP, which has occurred during a period of deep financial crisis in 
Sweden; however, the employee compensation share of GDP has increased from the low of 
1995 to 2012. In a similar pattern observed in the British and Swedish cases, the US data also 
shows a negative trend line for the wage share of GDP; however, there is much less fluctuat ion 
in the wage share between 1979 and 2012, which was posited by the relatively small standard 
deviation figure. In the Danish case, the lowest point of the employee compensation share of 
GDP came in the mid-1990s, which then increased to reach a peak in 2009, just after the GFC, 
followed by a subsequent decrease. Although the employee compensation share of GDP in 
Denmark has decreased by 0.34 percentage points between 1979 and 2012, the slightly positive 
linear trend line in figure 1 suggests that, on average, the employee compensation share of GDP 
has actually been on an upward trend in Denmark over this period, which is contrary to the 
other cases in this analysis. Therefore, the decrease in the employee compensation share of 
GDP in Denmark may simply be a reactionary adjustment to the aftermath of the GFC. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the differences in the OMB share of GDP between each case. An 
examination of the 2012 mortgage debt to GDP ratios of each country show that Denmark was 
the most leveraged state with a level of mortgage debt at 153.29 per cent of GDP, followed by 
the UK (87.21%), the USA (83.14) and Sweden (75.74%), which shows that while the UK and 
the US have similar mortgage debt to GDP ratios, these figures are dwarfed by the Danish 
figure. The largest increase in the mortgage stock between 1979 and 2012 occurred in the UK 
(2,807.61%), which corresponds to a 62.80 percentage point increase in the OMB share of 
British GDP. The Swedish mortgage stock increased by a slightly lower amount than Britain 
(2795.10%) during the same time period, which led to a 57.21 percentage point increase in the 
OMB share of GDP. The USA and Denmark had much smaller relative increases in the 
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mortgage stock than the UK or Sweden; in the US OMB grew by 1042.41 per cent, leading to 
a 33.40 percentage point increase in the OMB share of GDP, while Denmark had the smalles t 
increase in mortgage stock (970.63%), but the highest increase in the mortgage stock share of 
GDP (73.33 pp). In each case, the increases in OMB as a share of GDP vastly outpaced 
employee compensation growth, and the main increases in mortgage stock all occur after 2000, 
which coincides with the reduced interest rate environment after the synchronised monetary 
expansion implemented by central banks to address the East Asian financial crisis and the vast 
increase in demand for certain mortgage-backed securities as a form of government-guaranteed 
debt (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; IMF, 2014, 18). 
 
6. Findings 
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 provides estimates of the coefficients from the eight regression models. The signs of 
the coefficients accurately represent the direction of the substantive effects of the relationship 
between the two variables, however, as each model uses a non-linear independent variable to 
measure the OMB in each state, the coefficients may only provide reliable information as to 
the direction and the statistical significance of the relationship between OMB and the wage 
share of GDP, which is of more use to this analysis than the predictive capacity of the 
coefficient values (Martin and Stevenson, 2010, 41; Dana and Dawes, 2004)iv. The first column 
of table 2 demonstrates the results of the random effects PCSE regression (model 1). This 
shows that the positive growth in mortgage credit across the different VORC is statistica lly 
significantly negatively related to the wage share of GDP, and allows the null hypothesis to be 
rejected. The other two variables in the first model, the unemployment rate and the weighted 
RILE index, both have negative coefficients; however, neither of the effects of these two 
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variables may be considered statistically significant from zero. The results from the second 
model, which includes fixed effects to account for the country-level differences, shows simila r 
results to the first model in that there is a statistically significant negative relationship betwee n 
an increase in mortgage credit and the wage share of GDP, which also allows for the null 
hypothesis to be rejected. The lower coefficient value of the OMB variable in the FE model 
suggests that the effect of mortgage credit on the wage share is reduced once the country-leve l 
effects are taken into account. The unemployment rate variable also has a negative coefficient 
and is statistically significant, which means that a decrease in wage bargaining power has a 
negative effect on the wage share of GDP across the cases. The weighted RILE index also has 
a negative coefficient and is statistically significant; therefore, the wage share of GDP 
decreases as the ideological centre of parliament shifts to the right. 
 
6.1 Individual Country Results 
 
Models 3 through 6 segregate the pooled data into an analysis of their respective countries, and 
in each case, there is a negative relationship between an increase in mortgage credit and the 
wage share of GDP; however, the statistical significance of that relationship is different 
between the liberal and non-liberal VORC. The results from the corporatist market of Denmark 
(model 3) show that there is no statistically significant relationship between mortgage credit 
growth and the wage share. There is also no significant relationship between the unemployment 
rate and the wage share in the Danish case; however, the weighted RILE index variable was 
statistically significant from zero, and the negative direction of the coefficient for the RILE 
index shows that the wage share of GDP decreases as the ideological centre of parliament shifts 
to the right in Denmark. The results from the statist-developmentalist market of Sweden (model 
4) also show that there is no statistically significant relationship between mortgage credit 
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growth and the wage share. There is also no significant relationship between the unemployment 
rate and the wage share. Additionally, there was no significant relationship between the 
weighted RILE index and the wage share of GDP in the Swedish case.  
 The models for the UK (model 5) and the USA (model 6) display very similar results to 
one another, but different results from the Danish and Swedish cases. In the UK and the USA 
models there is a statistically significant negative relationship between an increase in mortgage 
credit and a decrease in the wage share of GDP, which allows the null hypothesis to be rejected 
in both cases. The direction of causality is of importance between these two key variables, and 
in both the British and US models the null hypothesis that the mortgage credit variable does 
not Granger-cause the changes in the wage share of GDP can also be rejected, which provides 
further evidence for a causal relationship between the increase in mortgage credit and the 
decrease in the wage share of GDP observed by the regression results in models 5 and 6. The 
unemployment variable in both models also has a statistically significant negative relationship 
to the wage share, which suggests a link between a decrease in wage bargaining power and a 
reduction in the wage share in both Britain and the USA. The weighted RILE index variable 
was not statistically significant in either model 5 or 6, therefore, the ideological centre of 
parliament has no meaningful effect on the wage share in either the USA or Britain. The 
divergent results between the different VORC models means that there can be no single effect 
that is common to every case, therefore, the fixed effects model (model 2) will not be used 
further in this analysis. The strong similarities between the results of the liberal British and US 
models, and the non-liberal Danish and Swedish models, suggest that comparing the results of 
the pooled liberal VORC to the pooled non-liberal VORC, in line with the VOWC literature, 
may provide an insight into the overall pooled data models. 
 
6.2 Welfare State Regime Results 
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Model 7 examines the pooled data for the liberal WSR cases, Britain and the USA, and as in 
both individual cases, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the 
increase in mortgage credit and a decrease in the wage share of GDP. The range of potential 
coefficient values maintains a negative value between -1.9145 and -0.3875 at a 99.99 per cent 
confidence interval, which provides strong evidence for the rejection of the null hypothesis in 
the liberal cases. As in models 5 and 6, there is a statistically significant negative relationship 
between the employment rate and the wage share of GDP, which shows that decreases in wage 
bargaining power places downward pressure on the wage share in liberal capitalism. There was 
no statistically significant relationship between the weighted RILE index and the wage share 
in model 7, which is congruent with the results in the individual subsetted models. Model 8 
examines the pooled data for social democratic WSR (or the non-liberal VORC) in this 
analysis, Denmark and Sweden. While the coefficient for the mortgage credit variable does 
have a negative sign in model 8, the relationship between OMB and the wage share is not 
statistically significant from zero. There was also no statistically significant relationship 
between either the unemployment rate or the RILE index and the wage share of GDP in model 
8. The analyses of models 7 and 8 suggest that the results from the liberal WSR may act as a 
source of bias in the overall pooled data results in this analysis (models 1 and 2), and there is 
no single generalizable relationship between the diffusion of mortgage credit and the wage 
share of GDP across the VORC. Therefore, there is a specific set of circumstances inherent to 
liberal capitalism that creates an environment where increases in mortgage credit lead to an 
overall reduction in the wage share of GDP, which is not present in the other VORC or WSR 
examined in this analysis. 
7. Discussion 
 
The results from the individual and pooled data regression models of the liberal markets of the 
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UK and the USA suggest that an increased engagement with the disciplinary mechanisms of 
mortgage finance will result in the reduction of the wage share of national income in liberal 
capitalism. This is not to suggest that the diffusion of mortgage credit is the sole explanation 
for the reduction in the wage share in the liberal markets; rather, it is that the mortgage credit 
channel of financialisation may be considered a significant underlying technical mechanism in 
Liberal capitalism that disciplines workers to adopt a subordinate position in capitalist power 
relations, which reinforces the conditions for capital accumulation at the expense of waged 
labour. Therefore, the “everyday life” decision by workers to engage with mortgage credit to 
purchase a home, no matter the motivation, has a negative effect on the distribution of materia l 
gains for workers relative to capital in liberal markets. In terms of a comparative politica l 
economy analysis, the results from models 7 and 8 suggest that the highly commodified private 
housing finance markets in liberal capitalism have a negative disciplinary effect on the wage 
share of national income. Although both the Danish and Swedish cases have similar or greater 
levels of mortgage debt in their economies than the UK and USA cases, the institutiona l 
configurations that shape the mortgage finance system, and the wider political economy of 
collective bargaining and welfare state structures, differ greatly between the liberal and non-
liberal markets, which may have positive counter-balancing effects on the disciplina ry 
mechanisms of mortgage finance.  
An examination of four important differences in the institutional configurations 
between the liberal market of Britain and the Corporatist market of Denmark may highlight 
how mortgage debt influences the wage share differently between the Liberal and non-libera l 
cases. Firstly, the back-end funding structure differs greatly between liberal and non-libera l 
mortgage markets, and non-liberal bond-based mortgage systems can provide lower cost 
mortgages that reduces the debt burden on borrowers. Mortgages in liberal markets are profit 
making vehicles for capital investment, facilitated by private banking institutions that generate 
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revenues from the interest rate margin between the rate at which they borrow and lend at, which 
varied between 0.82 and 2.43 percentage points above the bank rate in the aftermath of the 
GFC in Britain, and is passed onto the borrower (Winnett and Wallop, 2009). Alternative ly, 
Danish mortgages have traditionally been provided by co-operative credit associations that are 
based on a pass-through match funding system using covered bonds. The Danish system 
provides mortgages at close to market cost as the credit institutions do not add interest rate 
margins to mortgage products, and they generate revenue from charging annual fees that are 
sufficient to only cover administration costs that are approximately 0.5 per cent of the 
outstanding loan amount. For example, in 2015, the Danish central bank moved their short-
term interest rates into negative territory, and the negative interest rate environment has been 
passed on to mortgage borrowers who have been given mortgages at rates of up to negative 
0.0562 per cent (Duxbury and Gauthier-Villars, 2016; Milne, 2015). Therefore, the traditiona l 
Danish match-funding model has maintained the distribution of low-cost mortgage credit, 
which reduces the disciplinary weight of the monthly mortgage debt obligation payment in 
comparison with the liberal mortgage markets. Secondly, although mortgage loans in each case 
are recourse loans that carry the same negative consequences of default, the Danish match 
funding mortgage finance system allows for a greater flexibility when it comes to renegotiat ing 
repayments due to periods of lower income or unemployment for the borrower. If a borrower 
experiences difficulties making their mortgage payments, the mortgage finance institution is 
easily able to renegotiate the mortgage terms with the bond holder, even as a temporary 
measure, which allows borrowers to meet their debt obligations. Alternatively, renegotiating a 
mortgage in the liberal market of Britain is a complicated process, especially if the mortgage 
has been securitised and divided among many mortgage-backed securities. In 2015, 0.96 per 
cent of all mortgages in Britain were in arrears, which is more than four times higher than the 
Danish arrears rate of 0.21 per cent, which is significant as Denmark has a much higher 
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aggregate mortgage debt burden as a share of GDP in comparison to the UK (CML, 2015; 
Realkreditraadet, 2016). Therefore, the difference in structural constraints within the mortgage 
systems may well have contributed to a much higher arrears rate in the liberal markets than the 
non-liberal markets. Thirdly, the reduction in the wage share in financialised capitalism can be 
linked to the “structural weakness of organised labour” that has marginalised the ability of 
workers to successfully bargain for higher wages (Bengtsson and Ryner, 2014, 19).  Social 
Democratic states have strong traditions of co-operative collective wage bargaining with much 
higher rates of union membership when compared with workers in the liberal markets. 
Therefore, the decline of wage bargaining power that has occurred in liberal states since the 
early 1980s may weaken worker negotiations for higher wages, which further exaggerates their 
financial vulnerability when exposed to the disciplinary mechanisms of mortgage finance. The 
statistically significant negative relationship between an increase in the unemployment rate and 
the reduction of the wage share in the liberal markets (model 7) that is absent in the non-libera l 
(or Social Democratic) markets (model 8) suggests that wage bargaining power is significantly 
lower in the liberal cases than the non-liberal cases. Lastly, the threat of default from 
unemployment or lower wage shares may not have the same disciplinary effects in Social 
Democratic states due to the increased provision of de-commodified welfare state services in 
comparison to the limited provision of state services in liberal markets (Esping-Andersen, 
1990). Commodified welfare services in liberal states are provided through market operations  
based on a system of asset-based welfare, which primarily uses the asset-price gains from 
owner-occupied housing as a vehicle to access welfare services (Doling and Ford, 2007). 
Therefore, the increased exposure to the market provision of welfare services in the liberal 
cases may reinforce the “investor identities” of loss averse individuals, who are disciplined by 
their decision to take on mortgage debt as it is their primary means of accessing the asset-price 
gains from their housing asset that are necessary for them to access welfare services . 
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Homeowners in liberal markets are reliant on the home as a financial asset to provide welfare 
functions throughout their lifecycle (e.g. Smith and Searle, 2008), which may be reinforced by 
the increased exposure to the disciplinary mechanisms of mortgage finance through the 
reduction of the wage share. Therefore, the results from this analysis provide evidence for the 
trade-off between private homeownership and a strong welfare state (e.g. Kemeny, 1980; 
2005), as opposed to the trade-off between private homeownership and strong pension 
provision (e.g. Castles, 1998; 2005). 
The degree of unionisation, wage bargaining power and welfare state service provision 
may also be linked to political outcomes in each state, which was examined by the ideologica l 
centre of gravity of parliament in each model. While the political institutional settings of each 
VORC may be thought to effect the functional distribution of income in each state, only the 
Danish case (model 3) demonstrated any significant effects of any changes in the ideologica l 
centre of gravity of parliament. The results suggest that as political partisanship in the Danish 
parliament becomes increasing right-wing, which may be defined as the belief in individua l 
competition and the securing of personal rights, the wage share of national income decreases 
(Noel and Therien, 2008, 24). An analysis of this result is complicated by the changing 
structure of the Danish political system since the 1970s, as the shift from “old” politics to 
“new” politics in Denmark has created a division between right-wing economic policies, 
which, for example, seek to commodify welfare state functions and liberalise markets, and 
right-wing social policies, which prefer to preserve the state provision of welfare services that 
marginalises the role of the market (Harrits et al, 2010). However, a comprehensive explanation 
of the influence of the Danish political system over the wage share is beyond the scope of this 
quantitative analysis, and may be more fully articulated in a qualitative historical examination 
of the Danish case. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
This analysis has sought to establish a bridge between the financialisation and VORC 
literature through an examination of the disciplinary effects of the specific channel of mortgage 
credit on the wage share of national income in four counties across three different VORC. In 
each case examined by this analysis, the UK, USA, Denmark and Sweden, there has been an 
absolute reduction in the wage share of GDP between 1979 and 2012. The results from the 
pooled panel data regression models confirm that an increase in the outstanding mortgage stock 
has a statistically significant negative effect on the wage share of GDP across the three different 
VORC examined in this study. Such common outcomes across different typologies of 
residential capitalism may suggest that this negative relationship could be a generalisab le 
feature of financialised capitalism; however, once the results are segregated to a country level, 
there is a marked distinction in the results between liberal and non-liberal VORC, which limits 
the generalisability of the results. The statistical significance of the negative relationship 
between the increase in mortgage credit and a decrease in the wage share identified by the 
panel data analysis holds in both of the liberal markets of the UK and the USA, but does not 
hold in either the corporatist market of Denmark or the statist-developmentalist market of 
Sweden. Therefore, the “everyday life” decision to engage with the mortgage credit channel of 
financialisation can be understood as a technical disciplinary mechanism that reinforces the 
“investor identities” of borrowers and is an underlying causal factor that reproduces the 
conditions for capital accumulation at the expense of waged labour in Liberal capitalism. While 
this econometric analysis has demonstrated that there is a causal relationship between an 
increase in mortgage debt and the reduction of the wage share in liberal markets, the “investo r 
identity” mechanism that connects the two variables is specified in such a way that does not 
allow for it to be tested in this analysis. However, from a Critical Realist perspective, the results 
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have identified that mortgage debt is an underlying causal mechanism in the reduction of the 
wage share, which may be articulated more comprehensively in a future study. One way to 
address the weak causality of this macro-level examination could be to incorporate a micro-
level analysis of wages and mortgage payments into a multi- level model that would add further 
weight to the understanding of the disciplinary effects of mortgage debt on wage growth. 
Additionally, the introduction of a micro-level analysis may allow for an examination of the 
disciplinary effects of mortgage debt by income decile, which would allow for the 
identification of those income groups most effected by the disciplinary mechanisms of 
mortgage credit.  
An alternative explanation for the reduction in the wage share of GDP in the liberal 
cases may be that capital has simply been more productive than waged labour; however, the 
increased returns to capital are not due to an increase in factor productivity, but are rather 
related to the combination of a reduction in the rate of waged labour increases, as well as a 
shift from productive to financial capital (Bengtsson and Ryner, 2014, pp. 7-8). Additionally, 
from a comparative political economy perspective, the important differences in the institutiona l 
configurations between the liberal and non-liberal cases in this analysis may be reduced to four 
key aspects that have resulted in the disciplinary effects of mortgage credit: (1) mortgages in 
liberal markets may be provided at a higher cost to the borrower than in the non-liberal markets, 
increasing the disciplinary weight of the mortgage payment; (2) the widespread use of the 
mortgage bonds in non-liberal markets may allow for more flexible renegotiations in periods 
of borrower economic uncertainty in comparison to liberal markets; (3) the increased level of 
co-operative collective bargaining in Social Democratic states may strengthen worker wage 
negotiations; and (4) liberal asset-based welfare systems emphasise the importance of 
accessing financial gains from the private housing asset, which may reinforce the “investo r 
identities” of loss averse borrowers and increase the disciplinary effects of mortgage credit in 
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liberal states. While it is posited that these factors may explain the differences in the 
disciplinary effects of mortgage finance between the liberal and non-liberal cases, a full 
evaluation of these institutional configurations of each state is beyond the scope of this 
econometric analysis. A more comprehensive explanation of the different results between the 
liberal and non-liberal cases may be developed further in a qualitative case study of each state 
as a future research project.  
 
Endnotes 
i There is another typology of the VORC, described as the familial market, which has a high owner-
occupation rate, combined with a low mortgage debt to GDP ratio. However, a familial case (e.g. Italy) 
was not included in this analysis due to the lack of financial sophistication attributed to that specific 
typology, as the analysis of this paper seeks is limited to advanced financialised economies. 
 
ii See appendix A for an analysis of a fully specified panel data model, which demonstrates the validity 
of the efficient model specification used here. 
 
iii A full description of the data sources used to compile the dataset is available in appendix B. 
 
iv See appendix C for a full explanation of the data validation techniques and diagnostic tests performed 
on these regression models. 
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Appendix A: Expanded Model Specification 
 
Although the models developed in this paper have sought to adhere to Achen’s (2002) ROT to 
refine the accuracy of the model specification, the literature has identified key variables that 
may influence the formation of the wage share that were not included in the regression models. 
Therefore, a wider specification model has been developed to test the validity of the results of 
the refined models used in this analysis. Technological change and globalisation have been 
identified as key determinants of the wage share of national income (IMF, 2007). Technologica l 
change has been modelled using the capital-labour ratio, which is measured using the logarithm 
of net capital stock divided by number of persons employed in domestic industries, and the 
data was obtained from the AMECO database (Stockhammer, 2013, 21). Exports as a share of 
GDP, and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows as a share of GDP have been used as proxies 
for globalisation, and this data was obtained from the World Bank (2015) (Stockhammer, 2013, 
20). Labour productivity has also been identified as a significant causal factor in the formation 
of the wage share of national income (e.g OECD 2015a, 7), which can be measured in terms 
of GDP per hour worked, and the data was obtained from the OECD (2015b). The post-
Keynesian analysis of financialisation is measured in terms of ffinancial globalization, which 
is the logarithm of external assets plus external liabilities divided by GDP, and as per 
Stockhammer (2013) the data was obtained from Lane and Milesi- Ferretti (2007). The 
deregulation of the financial sector is another way to account for the financialisation of the 
economy, which has been modelled using the summary financial reform index developed by 
Abiad et al. (2008). The financial reform dataset only accounted for years up to 2006, therefore,  
specification models with and without this variable were included to maximise the number of 
available observations and degrees of freedom. Table 3 shows the results of the specificat ion 
models, and in both cases the sign and significance of the OMB variable is consistent with the 
Post-Peer-Review Copy Only – Full Article Submitted to Comparative European Politics 
Wood (2016) 29 
results from the main models used in this analysis, which is all that is necessary as the variable 
has been converted to a natural log. Therefore, one may conclude that the efficient model 
specification in this analysis, according to Achen’s ROT, may be considered valid.  
[insert table 3 here] 
  
Post-Peer-Review Copy Only – Full Article Submitted to Comparative European Politics 
Wood (2016) 30 
Appendix B: Data Sources 
 
An adequate pre-collated dataset was not readily available to examine the relationship between 
the wage share of GDP and mortgage credit growth in the USA, the United Kingdom, Sweden 
and Denmark between 1979 and 2012; therefore, an original dataset compiling data from each 
country had to be constructed. Data to construct the wage share variable, employee 
compensation and nominal GDP at factor cost for each case was obtained from the European 
Commission’s annual macro-economic database (AMECO, 2015). The data for the OMB 
variable was obtained from a variety of sources: a complete dataset of British OMB data for 
the selected time period was not available from a single source, and the data was compiled 
from two sources; data from 1979 to 1991 was obtained from the Council of Mortgage Lenders’ 
(CML) compendium of housing finance statistics (CML, 1997, 88), and data from 1992 to 2012 
was collected from the British Building Societies Association annual yearbook (Rex, 2013, 
102). All OMB data for the Swedish case was obtained from the Swedish statistics office 
(Statistics Sweden 2015); while the Danish OMB data from 1979 to 2011 was obtained from 
the Danish Central Bank (Abildgren, 2012), and the missing 2012 figure was obtained from 
the Association of Danish Mortgage Banks (Realkreditraadet, 2015). The OMB data for the 
USA was collected from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (2015) statistical database. The 
data for the unemployment rate for each country was also collected from the AMECO (2015) 
database. The RILE data was collected from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) 
database (version 2015a), which is a subjective qualitative content analysis of party election 
manifestos from domestic democratic elections, and contains data for each case covered by this 
analysis (Volkens et al, 2015). The data was transformed to the weighted RILE index using the 
Stata do-file provided on the CMP website. 
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Appendix C: Data Validation and Diagnostic Tests 
 
A Levin-Lin-Chu test was run on each variable in the pooled dataset to test for the presence of 
unit root, and in each case the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root could be 
rejected, which suggests that the panels are stationary for each variable. A cointegration test 
was also run for the key variables in the pooled data models, the wage share of GDP and OMB, 
and the tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, which suggests that there is a stable 
relationship between the key variables in this analysis. Post-regression diagnostic tests were 
performed on the four OLS models pertaining to the individual VORC (models 3-6), where 
each model was tested for the normality of the residuals, heteroskedasticity, serial correlation 
and multicollinearity. In each case the residuals were distributed normally, and each variable 
in each case had a VIF score of less then 5, which demonstrates that there is an absence of 
multicollinearity in the models (Belsey et al, 1980). A Breusch-Godfrey test was run for each 
OLS model to test for serial correlation, and the results show that in each case the null of no 
serial correlation must be rejected, therefore, first order autocorrelation (AR1) is present in 
each model. A test for heteroskedasticity was run on the OLS models and in each case, except 
for the British case (model 5), we fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity being 
true; therefore, it can be stated with at least 95 percent certainty that the errors are 
homoskedastic in the Swedish, Danish and US models, and are drawn from a distribution with 
a constant variance. To account for the serial correlation in each model and heteroskedastic ity 
of the British case, each individual model was re-run to include robust standard errors, which 
are included in the results table. As stated in the empirical design, the results form the pooled 
data models (1, 2, 7 and 8) were obtained using the AR1 autocorrelation structure and the 
assumption of panel-level heteroskedastic errors to address problems of serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity respectively. Each of the OLS models were also run using the bootstrap 
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resampling method, which replaces the unknown population distributions with the known 
empirical distributions originated by the regression to establish precise statistical estimates that 
allow for robust hypothesis testing using relatively few assumptions (Chernick, 2008). The 
bootstrap models were re-run with 2,000 repetitions, and each variable retained its statistica l 
significance as reported in the results section (table 3), with identical parameter estimates to 
the non-bootstrap models. Diagnostic tests were also run for each bootstrap model with results 
that were similar to the corresponding non-bootstrap models above. These bootstrap models, 
and the subsequent diagnostic tests performed on them, suggest that the results from the 
individual VORC models (models 3 to 6) may be considered valid and robust.  
 
  
Post-Peer-Review Copy Only – Full Article Submitted to Comparative European Politics 
Wood (2016) 33 
Works Cited 
 
AALBERS, M. B. 2008. The Financialization of Home and the Mortgage Market Crisis. 
Competition & Change, 12, 148-166. 
ABIAD, A. G., DETRAGIACHE, E. & TRESSEL, T. 2008. A New Database of Financial 
Reforms. IMF Working Papers, Vol.08/266. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund. 
ABILDGREN, K. 2012. Financial structures and the real effects of credit-supply shocks in 
Denmark 1922-2011. European Review of Economic History, 16, 490–510. 
ACHEN, C. H. 2002. Toward a new political methodology: Microfoundations and ART. 
Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 423-450. 
AMECO 2015. Annual macro-economic database. European Commission's Directorate 
General for Economic and Financial Affairs. 
ANSELL, B. 2014. The political economy of ownership: Housing markets and the welfare 
state. American Political Science Review, 108, 383-402. 
ARON, J. & MUELLBAUER, J. 2010. Modelling and forecasting UK mortgage arrears and 
possessions. 
BARBA, A. & PIVETTI, M. 2009. Rising household debt: Its causes and macroeconomic 
implications—a long-period analysis. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33, 113-137. 
BECK, N. & KATZ, J. N. 1995. What to do (and not to do) with time-series cross-section 
data. American political science review, 89, 634-647. 
BELSLEY, D. A., KUH, E. & WELSCH, R. E. 1980. Regression diagnostics : identifying 
influential data and sources of collinearity, New York ; Chichester, Wiley. 
BENGTSSON, E. & RYNER, M. 2014. The (International) Political Economy of Falling 
Wage Shares: Situating Working-Class Agency. New Political Economy, 1-25. 
Post-Peer-Review Copy Only – Full Article Submitted to Comparative European Politics 
Wood (2016) 34 
CASTLES, F. G. 1998. The really big trade-off: Home ownership and the welfare state in the 
new world and the old. Acta politica, 33, 5-19. 
CASTLES, F. G. 2005. The Kemeny Thesis Revisited. Housing, Theory and Society, 22, 84-
86. 
CHERNICK, M. R. 2008. Bootstrap methods : a guide for practitioners and researcers, 
Hoboken, N.J., Wiley ; Chichester : John Wiley [distributor]. 
CLARK, K. A. & HYSON, R. 2000. Measuring the demand for labor in the United States: 
The job openings and labor turnover survey. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
CLARKE, S. 1990. The Marxist Theory of Overaccumulation and Crisis. Science & Society, 
54, 442-467. 
COUNCIL OF MORTGAGE LENDERS. 1997. Compendium of Housing Finance Statistics, 
Council of Mortgage Lenders. 
COUNCIL OF MORTGAGE LENDERS. 2015. Mortgage arrears and repossessions continue 
to fall in second quarter [Online]. Council of Mortgage Lenders. Available: 
https://www.cml.org.uk/news/press-releases/mortgage-arrears-and-repossessions-
continue-to-fall-in-second/ [Accessed 18/04 2016]. 
DANA, J. & DAWES, R. M. 2004. The Superiority of Simple Alternatives to Regression for 
Social Science Predictions. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 29, 317-
331. 
DIAMOND, D. W. & RAJAN, R. 2009. The credit crisis: Conjectures about causes and 
remedies. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
DOLING, J. & FORD, J. 2007. A Union of Home Owners. International Journal of Housing 
Policy, 7, 113-127. 
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Figure 1: Employee compensation share of GDP. 
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Figure 2: Comparison between the wage and OMB share of GDP. 
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Tables 
 
Variable Country Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Wage Share Denmark 34 60.18 1.48 57.58 64.09 
 Sweden 34 58.14 2.09 53.72 63.73 
 UK 34 58.77 2.08 54.66 63.97 
 USA 34 56.06 1.18 53.7 58.15 
 Total 136 58.29 2.29 53.7 64.09 
OMB (ln) Denmark 34 27.49 0.69 26.26 28.53 
 Sweden 34 26.93 0.95 25.1 28.43 
 UK 34 26.61 1 24.53 27.87 
 USA 34 29.23 0.76 27.88 30.32 
 Total 136 27.56 1.33 24.53 30.32 
Unemployment Denmark 34 6.16 1.63 3.4 9.6 
 Sweden 34 5.63 2.73 1.6 9.9 
 UK 34 7.55 2.16 4.6 11.2 
 USA 34 6.42 1.64 4 9.7 
 Total 136 6.44 2.18 1.6 11.2 
RILE Index Denmark 34 1.92 9.41 -11.13 12.56 
 Sweden 34 -0.62 10.28 -9.89 21.88 
 UK 34 3.94 5.04 -3.02 10.75 
 USA 34 12.41 7.23 -8.61 20.86 
 Total 136 4.41 9.52 -11.13 21.88 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 1 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Random 
Effects 
Fixed Effects† Denmark Sweden UK USA Liberal 
VOWC (RE) 
S. Democratic 
VOWC (RE) 
         
Mortgage Stock (ln) -0.9462*** -0.7218*** -0.2875 -0.4676 -1.1528*** -1.1359*** -1.1510*** -0.0964 
 (0.2216) (0.2429) (0.4235) (0.6366) (0.3896) (0.2449) (0.1962) (0.5481) 
Unemployment Rate -0.1519 -0.2134*** -0.2241 -0.2831 -0.5405*** -0.3005*** -0.2200** -0.1980 
 (0.0865) (0.0790) (0.1482) (0.2141) (0.1080) (0.0710) (0.0953) (0.1396) 
Right-Left Index -0.0246 -0.0350** -0.0720** -0.0634 -0.0509 -0.0177 -0.0057 -0.0187 
 (0.0192) (0.0179) (0.0236) (0.0472) (0.0952) (0.0291) (0.0283) (0.0236) 
Constant 85.6469*** 81.4914*** 69.6032*** 72.2835*** 93.7303*** 91.4169*** 91.1604*** 63.2870*** 
 (6.2109) (6.6946) (12.0720) (16.1701) (10.4086) (6.7068) (5.5899) (14.7603) 
         
Observations 136 136 34 34 34 34 68 68 
R-squared 0.9483 0.9511 0.1988 0.4711 0.3695 0.7157 0.9676 0.9345 
Number of Groups 4 4 - - - - 2 2 
Table 2: Results of the PCSE and OLS analysis of the effects of mortgage credit growth on the wage share of GDP  
Standard errors reported in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
† Coefficients for country dummies are not reported
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Specification Model (1) (2) 
 With Financial 
Reforms 
Without Financial 
Reforms 
   
Mortgage Stock (ln) -1.1393*** -1.3907*** 
 (0.4112) (0.4315) 
Unemployment Rate -0.2307*** -0.2580*** 
 (0.0861) (0.0778) 
Right-Left Index -0.0254 -0.0479*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0183) 
Technological Change 3.75e+06*** 3.48e+06*** 
 (6.75e+05) (6.50e+05) 
Labour Productivity 0.0123 0.0308 
 (0.0459) (0.0430) 
Export Share of GDP -0.2419*** -0.2196*** 
 (0.0570) (0.0525) 
FDI Inflows -0.0742 0.0232 
 (0.1804) (0.1844) 
Financial Globalisation 2.0438*** 1.6104*** 
 (0.4121) (0.4019) 
Financial Reforms -5.141** - 
 2.4343 - 
Constant 127.3303*** 124.3340*** 
 (11.4368) (11.3562) 
   
Observations 120 96 
R-squared 0.9792 0.9750 
Number of Groups 4 4 
Table 3: Specification model results 
 
Standard errors reported in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
